Introduction and Summary
With the end of the cold war, there have been profound changes in the global security relationships. As a result, the proliferation risk associated with nuclear energy has become a focus of international discussions; the concerns regarding proliferation risks pose formidable challenges 1 . Nuclear energy has demonstrated the potential to help meet the rising energy demands, which are explosively growing in Asia, while at the same time reduce pollution emissions into the atmosphere 2 -including carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and heavy metals 3 (mercury, arsenic, lead, cadmium, and uranium).
The primary risks of the nuclear fuel cycle in regards to proliferation are:
• Diversion of weapons usable material by nations 4
• Diversion of weapons usable material by terrorist/theft 5 1 Indeed, the prospects for dramatic growth in nuclear power may depend on the effectiveness of and resources devoted to plans to develop and implement technologies as well as approaches that strengthen proliferation resistance. Although there are no approaches that can wholly eliminate the risk of proliferation by a determined state, technology can play a limited though very valuable role in reducing state threats and perhaps in eliminating many non-state threats [Pilat 2009 ].
2 !"#"$%#&'%(%)"#'*"%#+,#-./01/)2#3+*04,/'%1#&+5%'#&0*)"(6#7$/)*#/(#&'+8%3"%1#"+#3+)(.9% 3.2 billion tons of coal in 2020. As a result of its reliance on fossil fuels, China has 16 of the 20 most air-polluted cities in the world. According to the World Health Organization, approximately 2,000,000 premature deaths occur annually worldwide due to air-pollution. Approximately 656,000 Chinese citizens each year die prematurely due to outdoor air pollution; polluted drinking water kills another 95,000. In addition, the World Health Organization estimates that Chinese suffer approximately 75,155,000 asthma attacks per year as the result of air pollution.
3 A typical coal-fired power plant in China is estimated to annually produce:
• 3,700,000 tons of CO 2 • 10,000 tons of SO 2 • 500 tons of small airborne particles Potential proliferators may gain access to nuclear materials at various points within the nuclear fuel cycle. Today there are two main nuclear fuel cycles:
• Once-through, in which the main steps are uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor irradiation, and storage with the presumption that the used fuel will eventually be disposed of in a repository.
• Recycling, in which the main steps are enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor irradiation, short term storage, and reprocessing followed by: o Re-enrichment of the uranium and fabrication into new fuel elements for reactor irradiation 6 and o Storage of the plutonium oxide until fabricated into MOX fuel elements for reactor irradiation.
The first and most important attribute of a proliferant's potential to produce nuclear weapons is access to fissile material. To produce weapons-grade materials, a state needs to be able to either enrich uranium to weapons-grade (as Pakistan did and as Iran is apparently capable of doing should it choose to) or it needs to be able to recover plutonium from spent research reactor fuel (as North Korea did).
There are six different uranium enrichment technologies: gaseous diffusion, centrifuge enrichment, electromagnetic isotope separation, chemical and ion exchange enrichment, aerodynamic isotope separation, and laser enrichment (as developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory). The three reactor types 7 that have been used to produce weapons-grade plutonium are:
• Graphite moderated reactors (e.g., Hanford, Tomsk, North Korea, etc.)
• Heavy water moderated reactors (e.g., Savannah River, India, etc.) NOTE: In principle, any research reactor is capable of producing at least some plutonium, but the quantity that can be produced depends strongly on the reactor power. Only research reactors with a capacity greater than about 10 MW t can produce an amount that is generally considered sufficient to support an indigenous nuclear weapons effort.
A separations/reprocessing capacity must be developed for a state to be able to develop plutonium bomb program. These capabilities are fairly difficult to achieve because export controls and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards carefully monitor both the raw materials and the technologies associated with special nuclear materials. However, despite the fact that North Korea joined the IAEA in September 1974, signed an INFCIRC/66-type agreement on July 20, 1977 (this provided a mechanism to monitor some of their facilities), and acceded to the NPT in December 1985, North Korea began the construction of the so-called "radiochemical laboratory" some time between 1985 and 1987. 8 By late 1988, US satellite imagery detected what was suspected to be a nuclear reprocessing facility under construction near the 25 MW t reactor at Yongbyon. Since that time, North Korea has not only processed plutonium from the 25 MW t reactor, 9 but has also apparently exploded two test devices. North Korea has shown that, if a state has the political will, it can build and operate plutonium-processing facilities.
Similarly, any subnational group that wishes to recover plutonium for even a few weapons from stolen spent fuel must also develop a separation/reprocessing capacity. However, it should not be assumed that a subnational group would follow the lead of developed national bomb program and build massive structures to recover and purify the plutonium. Neither should it be assumed that a subnational group would use the widely used Purex Process to recover and purify the plutonium.
In its race to build the bomb, the United States used a precipitationbased method, the Bismuth Phosphate process, to recover and purify the plutonium used in early weapons. 10 In its quest for the bomb, the Soviets also used a precipitation process until about 1972, a modification of the sodium uranyl acetate analytical procedure, to recover and purify plutonium. Most, if not all of the British plutonium, was recovered and purified via the Butex (not Purex) Process. France independently developed its own version of Purex which included a Carbonate precipitation step.
Neither should it be assumed that a subnational group would recover and purify both the plutonium and the uranium.
In its quest for the bomb, the United States did not even attempt to recover the uranium in the early days of it nuclear program. North Korea separates the uranium and plutonium, but then only stores the uranium solution, perhaps to be purified at a later date.
Given this analysis, we conclude that all of the relevant and commonly used processing options available to a subnational group need to be addressed to effectively enhance the proliferation resistance of fuel. Specifically, we need to be aware that countermeasures that would make it more difficult to process via one 8 The facility is 600 feet in length, 65 feet wide, and several stories high, about the size of two football fields. 9 This indigenous experimental reactor was patterned after the declassified prints of the 1940's vintage Calder Hall gas-graphite reactor (an English MAGNOX reactor). 10 To save time, Du Pont elected to go forward with building the plutonium processing facility assuming that the selected process would be a precipitation process based upon the fact that most industrial separations processes at the time were based upon precipitation. The equipment for these industrial processes was fairly simple, and the steps could be repeated several times, if necessary, in the same equipment. method might not interfere at all with another method. To date, most developed processes have used a nitric acid solvent to dissolve the spent fuel or target. This is an excellent choice, but other aqueous solvents or even non-aqueous solvents such as molten metals or salts can be used.
In general, there are four measures [Kibriyama 2000 ] that that can be used to enhance the proliferation resistance 11 of the fuel:
• Self-Protection aspects of the material: Characteristics of the material that can complicate gaining physical control of a significant quantity of the weapons usable material. (Measures such as: rad/hr at 1 meter, number of items for 1 significant quantity, etc.) 
Proliferation Resistance Overview
The term proliferation resistance has been in use in regards to the nuclear fuel cycles since the 1950's [Feiveson 1979; Kibriyama 2000] . Numerous scientists have made proposals for proliferation resistant technologies over the past 30 to 40 years with specifications as to what proliferation resistance means to them. However, there is not common understanding as to exactly what proliferation resistant technology entails.
The IAEA defines proliferation resistance as follows:
Proliferation resistance is that characteristic of a nuclear system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology by states in order to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
In this analysis, we expand this often used definition of proliferation resistance by including the implementation of measures that would impede the successful exploitation of stolen nuclear materials by terrorists or other subnational groups for nuclear explosives.
The proliferation resistance of any plutonium form is determined by:
• The physical form of the material;
• The physical access afforded to the material; 11 Proliferation deterrence involve efforts to increase the technical difficulty as well as cost and time that is needed by the proliferators. In most cases the impact will be most effective if a state proliferators are not technologically advanced; the impact of proliferation resistance on non-state actors can be far more significant [Pilat 2009 ].
• The level of safeguards 12 and security that are applied to the material; and
• The national/subnational threat to the material.
All of these factors affect the resources and technical complexity for acquiring, transporting, and processing the material for use in a nuclear weapon. The degree of proliferation resistance results from a combination of, inter alia, technical design features, operational modalities, institutional arrangements and safeguards measures. This document does not deal with safeguards, security, or transportation. It also makes the assumption that the clandestine national/subnational group has obtained:
• A source of plutonium;
• That it has obtained the technology and required equipment to recover and purify the plutonium and then to fabricate a weapon; and • It has at least the explicit knowledge and expertise 13 to recover and purify the plutonium and then to fabricate a weapon should it so desire.
The Department of Energy (DOE) assigns attractiveness levels to the various forms of plutonium according to the amount of processing required to obtain weapons-usable material. These levels in order of decreasing attractiveness are:
1. Assembled weapons and test devices; 2. Directly convertible materials such as pits, buttons, and ingots; 3. High grade materials such as oxides, carbides, and nitrides; 4. Low-grade materials such as process residues; and 5. Highly irradiated forms.
Again, the first four DOE levels of attractiveness are outside the scope of this report. This report deals only with methods to attempt to render spent reactor fuel more proliferation resistant.
The form of the material in terms of its radiological, chemical, and physical characteristics affect the difficulty of processing the material for use in a nuclear explosive. At present there are over 400 reactors operating worldwide. Many of these reactors are having their licenses renewed for operation for another 20 to 40 years. New reactors being proposed are basically advanced versions of reactors now in operation. As a result, the basic fuel forms will not be radically changed for at least the next 40 to 60 years. Therefore, proliferation resistance of the fuel will be most likely limited to radiological and chemical makeup of the spent fuel. 12 The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. 13 Knowledge can be broadly categorized as explicit and tacit. Explicit knowledge includes technical information in the form of scientific research, engineering analysis, design documentation, operational date, maintenance records, regulatory reviews and other documents and data that can be transferred easily to interested parties. However, documents never comprise the expert's complete knowledge, and the novice reading those instructions might not end up with the same results as the expert. The tacit knowledge of the experts, including scientist, engineers, and technicians, is acquired over long period and my never be fully articulated.
Before spent reactor fuel can be used in weapons, it must be purified to remove both the fission products and the non-fissile parts of the fuel element. A number of methods have been used to recover and purify plutonium to support a state atomic bomb program. The most widely used method is the Purex Process [Purex Process 1977] . Other solvent extraction processes, e.g., Redox, Butex and Trigly, have also been used. Precipitation methods such as the sodium uranyl acetate precipitation process (used by the Soviets), the bismuth phosphate precipitation process (used by the United States), and carbonate precipitation process (used by France) were developed and used for short cooled fuel. However, it is not necessary to assume that a subnational group would choose to use short cooled fuel to be the source of plutonium for a few weapons. The commercial spent fuel-reprocessing program allows fuel to cool for at least four years prior to processing. The short-lived fission products, that necessitate short contact times in processing via aqueous/solvent separations methods, have decayed away during this cooling time. Without the necessity of short contact times, anion exchange becomes a very viable method to recover and purify plutonium for a small bomb program.
14 The overall goal of producing proliferation resistant fuel is to impede the diversion of special nuclear materials from civilian nuclear power spent fuel that could be used in the production of weapons. But, as can be seen from the above discussion, a number of different process parameters must be considered when addressing this problem. In addition, a credible nuclear threat from a sub-national group is different than that from a proliferant state. The perceived threat from a sub-national group is more dependent upon device producing any nuclear yield than it is upon the actual amount of yield. Even in a low technology, low quality device, any nuclear yield will, in most cases, vastly exceed that of conventional explosive device. Thus, any device capable of generating a nuclear yield would meet the requirements of a sub-national group. A proliferant state is more likely to have preference for materials that are more easily and efficiently fabricated into higher and more reliable yield nuclear weapons than those materials of interest to a sub-national (terrorist) group [Bathke 2009 ].
Some proposals suggest adding something to the fuel that would make the resulting plutonium non-useable for weapons. However, because of the unique aqueous-nitrate chemistry of plutonium, the most difficult elements to remove from plutonium are uranium, neptunium, and thorium; these four elements form neutral and/or anionic complex ions with nitrate ions; other elements do not form these complex ions.
• As a result of these neutral and anionic complex ions, in one pass of either solvent extraction or anion exchange, a uranium feedstock containing only a few hundred-parts-per-million plutonium can be purified to a few tens-of-parts-permillion uranium in the plutonium.
• Plutonium-238 is routinely separated via anion exchange, on the kilogram scale, from 237 Np reactor targets.
• Although plutonium and thorium are not generally produced together in a reactor, their separation requires very little modification of the standard solvent extraction or anion exchange processes. Pu, according to Bathke et al. [Bathke 2009 ]. Adding addition Pu further reduces the attractiveness of the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. For a subnational group in which any nuclear yield is acceptable, 80%
238
Pu is required to reduce the plutonium to "low" attractiveness. For an unadvanced proliferant nation in which a high yield reliable nuclear device is desirable, very little additional 238 Pu is required to lessen the plutonium attractiveness level.
From the stand point of theft of spent fuel by a terrorist group, it might be possible to enhance the radiation dose for a longer period of time -i, e., increase the time that the spent fuel is self-protecting. However, to be considered an effective deterrent to theft, a self-protecting characteristic must demonstrate its effect within a relatively short time period, according to Coates, et Pa perhaps yields any value added. However, Coates seems to question whether or not self-protection from a committed terrorist entity really does exist.
From a practical processing viewpoint, the purification of plutonium requires that it be brought into solution (aqueous, molten salt, or molten metal), so any approach that would prevent or cause difficulty exposing the fissile material to the processing solution or increase the difficulty of dissolution would be valuable in preventing the use of plutonium in a weapon. However, it should be clear that hindering the dissolution processes would render recovery and purification more difficult but not impossible. Likewise, adding a component that either would not dissolve or would emulsify the solvent would interfere with the processing via solvent extraction. Examples of oxides of elements that would not interfere with the operation of the reactor but would increase difficulty of separations are Al 2 O 3 , ZrO 2 and TiO 2 ; a burnable poison that might be added is HfO 2 . If sufficient ZrO 2 or HfO 2 could be added to yield a ceramic fuel that was very difficult to dissolve, then the difficulty of processing could be markedly increased. However, once the plutonium and uranium were dissolved, removal of these from the solutions via standard industrial practices would be relatively easy.
A corollary to this would be to add something whose activation product would yield a gas upon dissolution. In the production of weapons grade plutonium, the spent fuel or targets are cooled for over 140 days to allow the I31 I (half-life 8.05 days, i.e. >17 half-lives) to decay away. Additionally, silver filters are used in the off-gas stream to capture the remaining I31 I. Control is maintained on the nitrite concentration of the dissolver medium to prevent the oxidation of 
Discussion of Self-Protecting Fissile Materials From a Physics Perspective
Self-Protecting Spent Fuel. The IAEA considers spent fuel to be self-protecting if the radiation rate exceeds 1 Gy/hr (1 Sv/hr; 100 rad/hr) at one meter in air (unshielded). [Kang 2005; INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 1979; Pond 1996] . Current guidance considers highly radioactive special nuclear material (SNM) to be those materials that unshielded, emit a radiation dose rate of measured at 1 meter that exceed 100 rem per hour. Both DOE and IAEA used this definition. The basis for this number is as follows: A 350 rem absorbed dose is the mid-point of the 250-to 450-rem range generally accepted as the dose in which 50% the exposed people would be expect to die, 50% lethal dose LD 50 . Based on this, highly radioactive SNM's are considered to be those materials that will deliver a 350-rem dose in 3 hours, which was rounded to 100 rem/hr. Although a 350-rem dose is considered lethal for 50% of the people, the immediate health effects are minimal vomiting (emesis) with onset sometimes . between 0.5 and 16 hours after exposure. The delay to onset of emesis (especially when added to the three-hour exposure period) allows a substantial amount of time in which exposed personnel can function, even if at a reduced effectiveness (see Table I ) to complete a task. Cs isotopes is small. With few exceptions, the primary fission product isotopes, which render the spent fuel selfprotecting, have half-lives of one year or less. Hence by the time fuel has been cooled for four years, most of the "hot" isotopes have passed through four to >100 half-lives. Specific examples include [Bathke 2009 ], it is safe to assume that perhaps half or more of the spent fuel in the United States today is no longer self-protecting, utilizing the 100-rad/hr definition. Assuming the more realistic 500-rad/hr-dose rate, perhaps all of the fuel discharged prior to about 2004 or 2005 is no longer self-protecting.
Another theoretical method that may be used to make spent fuel more proliferation resistant is to add an element to the fuel meat whose irradiation product would raise the radiation dose of the plutonium product above the low (1 Sv/hr) IAEA threshold for self-protecting. A variety of elements whose neutron activation products are highly active are potential candidates for this scheme. The half-lives would have to be long enough, yet short enough, to provide a high dose over an extended period of time. Isotopes that have been proposed in the past include • Gold-198 (the neutron activation product of 197 Au) with a half-life of 2.7 days, however, would provide a high dose for only a few days.
• Tantalum-182 (the neutron activation product of 182 Ta) with a half-life of 115 days, however, would provide a high dose for a few months.
• Zinc-65 (the neutron activation product of 64 Zn) with a half-life of 243.7 days, however, would provide a high dose for a year or two.
• Cobalt-60 (the neutron activation product of 59 Co) with half-life of 5.259 years would provide additional radiation dose, at most, for a decade or so.
• Under neutron irradiation, Pa to the fresh fuel might increase the time that the spent fuel is self-protecting to 100 years or more, under the 1 Sv/hr (100 rad/hr) definition of self-protecting.
Detailed calculations would have to be made to determine the amount of the precursor isotopes that would have to be added to yield enhanced protection. 15 If such calculations were done, it is suggested that a minimum of the 500-rad/hr-dose rate be assumed for the calculations. In the case of 231 Pa, a source search would have to be made to determine whether sufficient quantities of the isotope could be procured. The isotope is present in uranium ore, but traditionally 231 Pa has not been recovered on any scale that would allow its used on an industrial scale.
Reducing the Strategic Value of the Plutonium
Even though it requires a higher fissile content in the initial fuel and the addition of burnable poisons to control the reactivity in the beginning of the irradiation cycle, the present trend is toward higher and higher burn-ups in the LWR-MOX fuel cycles. This has two beneficial proliferation enhancements:
• The so-called self-protection time (at a dose of > 1 SV/hr) is extended • The ratio of weapons non-desirable plutonium isotopes ( ORIGEN code calculations would give an indication of how the plutonium isotopic content changed with the higher burn-ups. Weapons design code calculations would be necessary to estimate the expected yield of any weapon fabricated from such plutonium. Only then could a realistic determination be made as to the over all effect of the increased burn-up.
Another method to reduce the strategic value of a fuel element is to reduce the amount of plutonium produced by adding an element such a thorium; this would reduce the amount of plutonium generated by neutron capture. Thorium is fertile but it is not fissile. The activation product, however, is Th to absorb the neutrons, would yield smaller amount of plutonium than just 238 U absorber in the reactor. Adding a few tens of ppm 231 Pa to the fuel would assure the production of 232 U; this would assure that a very strong gamma would remain with the uranium should a terrorist group try to enrich the 233 U and then fabricate a weapon from the enriched 233 U. The major impact of this option would be to increase the number of fuel elements that must be stolen to yield a significant quantity of plutonium. The added amount of processing required and the extra difficulty of processing fuel containing Th, U, and Pu would substantially increase the time required to recover and purify a significant quantity of plutonium.
Some Th-U fuel mixtures have been analyzed [Bathke 2009 ]. This analysis suggests that this cycle produces two isotopes of safeguards concern: 233 U bred from the thorium and 239 Pu bred from the low enriched, natural, or depleted uranium that is introduced to dilute the 233 U that is bred from the thorium. This study notes that smaller quantities of 239 Pu are produced than would be when burning uranium fuel. However, the case not studied was fabricating a MOX fuel of reactor grade plutonium, depleted uranium and thorium, perhaps with the addition of a small amount of protactinium. In general, when MOX fuel is burned in a reactor, plutonium is both burned and created. At the end of the cycle, the net increase in plutonium is zero. Therefore, burning a MOX fuel of reactor grade plutonium, depleted uranium and thorium should actually burn more plutonium than is created.
In addition to actually decreasing the amount of plutonium in the world, this fuel mixture would also have the following benefits:
• Decrease the amount of uranium that would have to be enriched 238 Pu has been calculated to be between 9.6 and 9.8 kg [Kang 2005; Wright 2000 ] and the gamma dose rate is only 6.09 mSv/hr-kg (three orders of magnitude below the IAEA's threshold for self-protecting), the lack of the necessity for safeguards is the result of the heat released by the 238 Pu. At a heat release of 568 W/kg for 238 Pu, a critical mass of 238 Pu metal would be far above the melting point of plutonium metal (~ 640°C). This amount of heat would also decompose any organic compounds in a matter of a few moments; hence high explosives (HE) could not be packed around the plutonium, even if the plutonium were in the oxide form.
Granted, if producing stockpile weapons with reliable yields were the goal of a proliferating nation, steps could perhaps be taken to remove the heat from plutonium containing high isotopic concentrations of 238 Pu. A terrorist group, not interested in stockpile weapons with reliable yields, could delay arming the weapon to the last possible minute and therefore could perhaps tolerate a higher heat value. To make a definitive determination of how much 238 Pu would be necessary in the plutonium to render it useless would require extensive bomb code calculations that are outside the scope of this study. [Kang 2005] , showing that the dose rate from weapons-grade plutonium is about 8 x 10 -7 Sv/hr-kg. This dose is about seven orders of magnitude below the IAEA's threshold for self-protecting. The thermal flux from weapons-grade plutonium is about 2.3 watts per kg; this is far below the threshold to thermally decompose the organic high explosive packed around the plutonium pit. Hence, fabricating and storing stockpile weapons is possible.
Weapons-Grade Uranium. Weapons can be fabricated from highly enriched (fissionable) uranium-235. However, if the uranium is diluted with fertile but nonfissionable 238 U to a point that the 235 U is less than 20%, then a weapon cannot be fabricated from the uranium without re-enriching it. 16 To get 80%
ZH8 Pu requires irradiating a target of 237 Np or 241 Am.
Self-Protecting Summary From a Physics Perspective
From the physics viewpoint, it appears that theoretically there are three basic methods to discourage a terrorist from trying to fabricate a weapon from stolen plutonium.
1. Maintain the dose rate at greater than 1 Gy/hr (1 Sv/hr; 100 rad/hr at one meter in air.
This raises the possibility of adding an element to the fuel meat or the cladding whose irradiation product would lengthen the time where the radiation dose would be above the IAEA threshold for selfprotecting.
In light of worldwide terrorist events that graphically demonstrate the resolve of the perpetrators and their disregard for self-preservation, it seems reasonable and prudent to consider that terrorist will be willing to expose themselves to extreme (lethal) levels of radiation [Coates 2005] . It would therefore seem that this option would have a limited effect on proliferation resistance from a terrorist viewpoint. However, this option may have major impacts on safeguards, measurements and on facility operating procedures and costs.
2. Increase the thermal flux of the fissile material such that the explosive compounds necessary to ignite the fission weapons would decompose before the weapons could be used.
Add an element to the fuel meat whose irradiation product would follow the plutonium through the separation and purification process that would raise the thermal flux. For plutonium, only isotopes that generate 238 Pu could possibly fit this requirement.
Extensive ORIGIN analyses and extensive bomb calculations would be necessary to determine if it is possible to raise the 238 Pu content high enough decompose the high explosive prior to ignition of the weapon. Whereas it is conceivable that sufficient 238 Pu might be bred into the fuel to prevent the stockpiling of weapons, arming a weapon at the last possible minute might allow the high explosive to be stable for a sufficient time to ignite the weapon. Therefore, this has primarily nuisance value; it is not a serious deterrent although it might create significant design constraints and handling problems.
3. Isotopically dilute the fissile element so that the fissile element would no longer yield a nuclear explosion.
Unlike uranium that has both fissile and fertile isotopes, all isotopes of plutonium are fissile. As a result, increasing the concentration of the even isotopes of plutonium does increase the amount necessary for a weapon, and they may increase the difficulty of fabricating and delivering the weapon; however, this does not render the plutonium non-usable in a weapon. The major benefit of isotopic dilution of plutonium is that perhaps additional spent fuel rods would have to be stolen and processed, increasing the likelihood of detection. Also, the time necessary to process a significant quantity of plutonium to fabricate a weapon would likely increase.
In summary, markedly enhancing proliferation resistance from a purely physics viewpoint has a low probability of success, given the scenarios considered here. It is, however, possible to reduce the amount of plutonium that would be produced in a reactor by using both 238 U and 232 Th as the fertile isotopes.
The major impact of this latter option would be to increase the number of fuel elements that must be stolen to yield a significant quantity of plutonium. The added amount of processing required and the extra difficulty of processing fuel containing Th, U, and Pu would add precious time required to recover and purify a significant quantity of plutonium.
Finally, it is clear that novel schemes need to be considered and developed if the physics-based approach is to be effective in deterring the misuse of spent fuel rods. Success in this area would constitute an intrinsic, or engineering, rather than an extrinsic solution to this thorny problem and would substantially ensure the security of the nuclear energy cycle for peaceful applications.
Self-Protecting From a Chemistry Perspective
There are several theoretical methods that may be used to make spent fuel more proliferation resistant:
1. Add an element to the fuel meat whose irradiation product would follow the plutonium through the separation and purification process that would either:
a. Raise the radiation dose of the plutonium product far above the low (1 Sv/hr) IAEA threshold for self-protecting b. Interfere with the machining of a weapon c. Interfere with the detonation of a weapon ! As a result of the unique chemistry of plutonium, there are no isotopes that would both follow the plutonium through the purification process and add additional radiation that even approaches the low (1 Sv/hr) IAEA threshold for self-protection. ! Of all the elements that might interfere with machining or detonation, only 238 Pu would actually follow plutonium through the purification process. This isotope can be generated in the fuel meat by adding either Np and 214 Am would be more beneficial.
As discussed above, this approach adds primarily nuisance value; it is not a serious deterrent although it might create significant design constraints and handling difficulties.
2. Add an element to the fuel cladding or prepare the fuel form in such a way that would interfere with exposing the fuel meat to the process solution. It is not necessary to dissolve the fuel cladding to expose the fuel meat to the dissolution solvent, be it aqueous or molten salt.
• For Savannah River plutonium production targets, the target meat was clad in aluminum; this cladding was simply dissolved in a solution of NaOH-NaNO 3 .
• France and England used MAGNOX fueled reactors; these fuel elements were mechanically decladded.
• Savannah River removed the stainless steel cladding of fuel elements using an electrolytic dissolver to dissolve the stainless steel.
• On a commercial scale, the Zircaloy clad fuel is simply sheared into small pieces to expose the fuel meat.
Simply adding any element to the cladding to interfere with exposing the fuel meat is ineffective.
Changing the shape of the fuel does have an effect on the method of exposure of the fuel meat. For instance, the Pebble Bed reactor uses tennis ball-sized pebbles that are made of pyrolytic graphite (which acts as the moderator), and they contain thousands of micro fuel particles called TR1SO particles. These TRISO fuel particles consist of a fissile material (such as 235 U) surrounded by a coated ceramic layer of SiC for structural integrity. These "pebbles" would have to be ground, perhaps in a ball mill or rod mill, to expose the fuel meat. It might be beneficial to remove the pyrolytic graphite. As a result of the density differences between pyrolytic graphite and the fuel particles, sluicing could possibly do this.
3. Add an element to the fuel meat whose irradiation product would interfere with the recovery and purification process:
• Make dissolution in the recovery medium very difficult • Interfere with the separation processes, i.e., emulsify the solvent
Interference with Purification Processes
Basically, there are two methods to interfere with the aqueous/organic purification processes. One is the introduction of an emulsifier to emulsify the solvent; the other is to add something that would plug the ion exchange columns. Silica fills the bill for both of these. Silica is the activation product of aluminum. However, silica is easily removed from aqueous solutions. If large amounts of silica are present, simple digestion will coagulate the silica and it can be removed via centrifugation. If smaller amounts are present, gelatin can be added prior to digestion-the coagulated silicagelatin is then removed via centrifugation.
REACTOR OPERATIONS
When a reactor is operating, a vast number of reactions are happening. When fresh fuel is added to the reactor the first set of reactions are the generation of 236 U,
238
Pu. and
239
Pu via the reactions: As a final observation, we note that the incorporation of isotopes to the fuel that will transform into the primary heat generating isotopes would make the recovered plutonium less desirable for weapons. Therefore, the most promising isotopes to add either to fresh uranium fuel or to MOX fuel are 237 Np and 241 Am.
Burnable Poisons
Attainment of high burn-up of nuclear fuels in a reactor involves substantial difficulties and complexities in controlling fuel consumption. To simplify controlling the reactor, fuel manufactures typically add burnable poisons (a substance with a large neutron cross-section) to the fresh fuel. Typical examples are boron, gadolinium, and hafnium. If a burnable poison can be added that yields a long-lived isotope that would give a sufficient dose rate, then the time that the fuel would be self protecting would be lengthened. Actinide isotopes are not generally thought of as burnable poisons, however in this application, they might be useful.
Curium Isotopes
Curium isotopes are generated in spent fuel through neutron capture by americium isotopes. The only curium isotope with a sufficiently long half-life, and a high enough gamma radiation dose rate to affect the dose of the spent fuel is Cm could be generated within the spent fuel, it could keep the dose at a higher rate in the first 50 or so years of cooling. Its calculated gamma dose rate is 6 Sv/hr-kg. However, only three curium isotopes ( 
Americium Isotopes
Americium isotopes are generated in spent fuel via the reactions:
Even though both of these isotopes build up in the fuel, neither of these isotopes have a sufficient dose rate to keep the spent fuel self-protecting. Although this would not raise the gamma dose rate sufficiently to make the fuel selfprotecting, it would raise the thermal flux from the recovered and purified plutonium. If MOX fuel were prepared from well-aged fuels-grade plutonium oxide, the 
Stable Elements
A variety of elements whose neutron activation products are highly active could possibly be added to the fuel. The half-lives would have to be long enough, yet short enough, to provide a high dose over an extended period of time. Co. Gold, however, would provide a high dose for only a few days. Tantalum and zinc would provide a high dose for a few months.
60
Co (the neutron activation product of 59 Co) would provide additional radiation dose, at most, for a decade or so. As a result of the unique chemistry of plutonium, these elements would not follow the plutonium through any of the known purification cycles. Therefore at best, these would add only to the self-protection of the spent fuel. With the exception of 60 Co, the added protection would be restricted, at most, to the early days of the cooling cycle and therefore would probably not justify the effort.
Cobalt
A fictional doomsday bomb, made popular by Neville Shute's 1957 novel, and subsequent 1959 movie, On the Beach, the cobalt bomb was a hydrogen bomb with a jacket of ordinary cobalt metal. During the explosion, the cobalt metal would be transmuted via neutron bombardment into the isotope 60 Co. This isotope, with a half-life of 5.27 years, is a very strong emitter of gamma rays as it undergoes beta decay to an excited state and which then relaxes to the ground state of 60 Ni, thereby releasing gamma radiation. The short half-life and the intensity of the radioactivity caused Leo Szilard to suggest that such bombs could wipe out all life on earth. The neutron-activated cobalt supposedly would have maximized the environmental damage from the radioactive fallout. In the first few hours after detonation, the gamma radiation produced by the fission products would be more intense than that produced by the neutron activated 60 Co. Since the majority of the fission products have half-lives less than a year, many less than an hour, at one year the dose from the 60 Co is greater than from the remaining fission products by nearly an order of magnitude. However, after about 10 years, the two fission-product pairs, Co would not follow the plutonium through any of the known plutonium purification cycles (precipitation, solvent extraction, or ion exchange techniques). And at best, 60 Co would add only to the self-protection of the spent fuel.
Increasing the isotopic ratio of 238 Pu/Pu
There are two major approaches to enhance the proliferation resistance of plutonium from a power reactor: Am also serve burnable poisons to hold-down the initial reactivity of the fuel.
Based on criticality mass considerations, the 235 U enrichment limit for proliferation resistance is 20%. However, unlike uranium, any isotopic mixture of plutonium has a finite bare critical mass. Hence, there is no general isotopic concentration threshold for plutonium isotopes from a criticality point-of-view. Nevertheless, the suitability for weapons usage varies significantly amongst plutonium isotopes. Mark [Mark 1993] lists the important characteristics of plutonium isotopes. 240 Pu and 242 Pu have high spontaneous neutron generation, which reduces the bomb yield significantly. Plutonium-238 also has high decay heat, which also complicates the design of the weapon. Addition of sufficient Chang [Chang 2008 ] has shown in a study of high burn-up LEU fuel that the 238 Pu content of discharged fuel can be raised to the 15 -19% 238 Pu range by the addition of 237 Np and 241 Am.
Conclusion
Global appetite for fission power is projected to grow dramatically this century, and for good reason. Despite considerable research to identify new sources of energy, fission remains the most plentiful and practical alternative to fossil fuels. The environmental challenges of fossil fuel have made the fission power option increasingly attractive, particularly as we are forced to rely on reserves in ecologically fragile or politically unstable corners of the globe. Caught between a globally eroding fossil fuel reserve as well as the uncertainty and considerable costs in the development of fusion power, most of the world will most likely come to rely on fission power for at least the remainder of the 21 st century.
Despite inevitable growth, fission power faces enduring challenges in sustainability and security. One of fission power's greatest hurdles to universal acceptance is the risk of potential misuse for nefarious purposes of fissionable byproducts in spent fuel, such as plutonium. With this issue in mind, we have discussed intrinsic concepts in this report that are motivated by the premise that the utility, desirability, and applicability of nuclear materials can be reduced. In a general sense, the intrinsic solutions aim to reduce or eliminate the quantity of existing weaponsusable material; avoid production of new weapons-usable material through enrichment, breeding, extraction; or employ engineering solutions to make the fuel cycle less useful or more difficult for producing weapons-usable material.
By their nature, these schemes require modifications to existing fuel cycles. As such, the concomitants of these modifications require engagement from the nuclearreactor and fuel-design community to fully assess their effects. Unfortunately, active pursuit of any scheme that could further complicate the spread of domestic nuclear power will probably be understandably unpopular. Nevertheless, the nonproliferation and counterterrorism issues are paramount, and we posit that the exploration, development, and implementation of intrinsic mechanisms such as discussed here are part of a balanced approach aimed at preventing the misuse of nuclear material for nuclear-energy applications.
